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Abstract
Trust and cooperation often break down across group boundaries, contributing to pernicious consequences, from
polarized political structures to intractable conflict. As such, addressing such conflicts require first understanding why
trust is reduced in intergroup settings. Here, we clarify the structure of intergroup trust using neuroscientific and behavioral
methods. We found that trusting ingroup members produced activity in brain areas associated with reward, whereas
trusting outgroup members produced activity in areas associated with top-down control. Behaviorally, time pressure—
which reduces people’s ability to exert control—reduced individuals’ trust in outgroup, but not ingroup members.
These data suggest that the exertion of control can help recover trust in intergroup settings, offering potential avenues for
reducing intergroup failures in trust and the consequences of these failures.
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Introduction
Global communication, diplomacy and trade increasingly require
individuals to cooperate with members of other ethnic, social
and cultural groups (Friedman, 2006), but this need often clashes
with longstanding parochial preferences (Choi and Bowles, 2007;
Balliet et al., 2014). Individuals tend to favor members of their
own groups over outsiders and cooperate less with outgroup,
when compared with ingroup members (Levine et al., 2005), pro-
pensities that likely reflect evolutionary pressures of social living
(Kurzban and Leary, 2001). Such ingroup favoritism, although in
some ways evolutionarily adaptive, often limits people’s ability
to meet modern demands and form coalitions across groups.
Failures in intergroup relations, in turn, produce a number of per-
nicious consequences, from increasingly polarized political
structures to intractable conflict (Ross and Ward, 1995).
Ingroup favoritism expresses itself through a number of psy-
chological channels, including favorable beliefs about ingroup,
when compared with outgroup members (Tajfel, 1982),
dehumanization of outgroup members (Haslam and Loughnan,
2014) and distrust of outgroup members (Brewer, 1999; Stanley
et al., 2011; Balliet et al., 2014). Here we focus on the last of these
factors. Interpersonal trust is key to successful cooperation
and—at a larger scale—economic growth (Zak and Knack, 2001),
and intergroup breakdowns in trust foment conflict (Ross and
Ward, 1995). As such, understanding intergroup distrust is crit-
ical to minimizing such conflicts.
Here we adjudicate between two predictions about inter-
group trust and the psychological mechanisms of trust more
broadly. On one hand, trust might be driven by a single mechan-
ism. One candidate mechanism is subjective value. Individuals
could find trust valuable for at least two reasons: (i) it consti-
tutes an affiliative act that helps them identify with a group
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995) and (ii) it often produces coopera-
tive outcomes that benefit all individuals (Zaki and Mitchell,
2013). If trust is driven by value calculations, then intergroup
failures in trust might reflect a lack of subjective value associ-
ated with trusting outgroup members. Under this model,
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intergroup effects on trust would reflect a difference in the de-
gree to which trust is valued across group boundaries, which in
turn produces behavioral discrepancies in trust.
On the other hand, trust might be driven by multiple mechan-
isms. For instance, even when trust is not experienced as sub-
jectively valuable, individuals might exert top-down control to
trust others when in their best interest. Under such a dual-
process model, intergroup trust might reflect fundamentally
different kinds of processes. In particular, people might trust
ingroup members to the extent that it produces subjective
value, but uniquely require top-down control to trust outgroup
members (Hughes and Zaki, 2015). If this is the case, intergroup
failures in trust could reflect individuals’ failure to engage such
deliberative control.
Research across social and biological science provides useful
neural and behavioral ‘markers’ of subjective value and top-
down control. First, dissociable brain systems reliably track the
experience of value and control. A large body of work demon-
strates that activity in the mesolimbic dopaminergic system—
including the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vMPFC)—scales linearly with the subjective value assigned to a
wide variety of stimuli (Bartra et al., 2013; Ruff and Fehr, 2014),
including decisions to trust others (Rilling et al., 2002; Fareri
et al., 2015). In contrast, a prefrontal cortical network—including
the dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) and lateral prefrontal cor-
tex (LPFC)—commonly responds to tasks that require top-down
control, such as conflict monitoring, reappraisal and error cor-
rection (Badre, 2008; Shackman et al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 2013).
Activity in dACC and LPFC further tracks cognitive effort and
choice difficulty (Shenhav et al., 2014).
The dissociation between value and control also character-
izes value-based decision-making. As an example, consider
intertemporal choice. Single mechanism accounts of this phe-
nomenon suggest that the value individuals assign to immedi-
ate versus delayed rewards is represented through a single,
integrated valuation mechanism, marked by activity in the stri-
atum (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). In contrast, dual-process ac-
counts suggests that whereas immediate or ‘hot’ rewards are
represented through value computations in striatum, activation
of regions involved in executive control, including dACC and
LPFC, are engaged to promote delayed or ‘cool’ rewards
(McClure et al., 2004; Bhanji and Beer, 2012), including through
the modulation of value-responsive regions (Hare et al., 2009).
Here, we leveraged these neural markers of subjective value
and control to adjudicate between models of intergroup trust. If
trust reflects a single value-computation process (e.g. subjective
value, Kable and Glimcher, 2007), then trusting outgroup, when
compared with ingroup members, should produce less activity
in mesolimbic structures, and this discrepancy should track in-
dividuals’ unwillingness to trust across group boundaries.
Alternatively, under a dual-process model (e.g. McClure et al.,
2004; Hare et al., 2009), trusting outgroup, when compared with
ingroup members should uniquely produce activity in struc-
tures related to control, including dACC and LPFC. Further, this
control-related activity should (i) track individuals’ ability to
overcome affective biases and trust outgroup members and (ii)
modulate value signals in the striatum during outgroup trust
decisions.
A second marker of control often used to test dual-process
models is reaction time. Classic theoretical and behavioral work
demonstrates that responses that require top-down control
become disrupted when processing-time or cognitive resources
are limited (Kahneman, 2003). This generates a second clear
prediction about intergroup trust. In particular, if outgroup, but
not ingroup, trust requires control, then limiting participants’
time to deliberate about their decisions should reduce their out-
group trust, but leave ingroup trust unaffected.
Here, we employed an experimental economics approach in
conjunction with neuroimaging to test these predictions about
single and dual-process models of intergroup trust. Participants
completed modified trust games in which they made single-
shot decisions about whether to trust ingroup and outgroup
members with real money. Participants were assigned to be in-
vestors and decided how much money to send to in- and out-
group trustees. The amount of money entrusted is quadrupled,
and the trustee can either cooperate and return half the money
(thereby doubling the initial investment) or defect and keep the
entire sum. The best payoff for both players is to behave unself-
ishly and cooperate. However, the best payoff for the trustee is
to behave selfishly and defect. Therefore, sharing money is in
the investor’s best interest, but only if the trustee unselfishly
cooperates. As such, investment in this task serves as a behav-
ioral proxy of trust.
In the first experiment, we used functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging (fMRI) to investigate whether (i) intergroup trust
processes differ only in the extent to which they draw on value-
related neural activity (consistent with a difference of degree) or
(ii) outgroup trust uniquely engages regions involved in top-
down control (consistent with a difference of kind). In the second
experiment, we investigated whether limiting participants’ re-
sponse time differentially affects competitive outgroup, as com-
pared to ingroup trust.
Methods
Study 1
Participants. Twenty-six participants were recruited in compli-
ance with the human subjects regulations of Stanford
University and compensated with $15/h or course credit (15
females, mean age¼ 19.1 years, s.d.¼ 1.1). This sample size was
determined a priori to provide power of 0.80 to detect differences
in intergroup trust (ingroup vs outgroup) based on an estimated
effect size of d¼ 0.88, derived from recent studies that also em-
ploy a within-subject, repeated-measures trust game to investi-
gate cooperation (Delgado et al., 2005). Five participants were
excluded from analyses (three participants were excluded due
to excessive head motion >2.0 mm from one volume of acquisi-
tion to the next along any dimension or across the duration of
the scan, one participant was excluded due to the scanner mal-
function, one participant was excluded for failing to respond to
over 50% of trials). The remaining 21 participants (12 females,
mean age¼ 18.8 years, s.d. ¼ 0.75) were all right-handed, native
English speakers, free from medications and psychological and
neurological conditions, and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Because the present study examines intergroup
trust, all participants were prescreened to ensure that they
were members of the ingroup condition (i.e. Stanford University
students). Finally, participants completed the Collective Self-
Esteem Scale (CSES: Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) to ensure that
they would experience a motivation to favor ingroup members.
Participants all reported positive associations with their social
identity as Stanford students (M¼ 5.5, s.d.¼ 0.4).
Procedure. Participants completed a modified version of the
trust game in which they made iterated choices about how
much money ($0 to $4, in increments of $1) to invest with trust-
ees. Critically, trustees were ostensibly either ingroup members
(i.e. Stanford University students) or outgroup members (i.e. UC-
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Berkeley students). In addition, participants completed a series
of trust decisions with trustees devoid of group membership in-
formation to serve as control trials. The control trials estab-
lished a behavioral baseline of trust and made the group
membership manipulation salient. Participants were instructed
that the amount they sent to the ostensible trustees would be
quadrupled and then allocated based on the trustee’s decision.
Specifically, the trustee could either equally share the money
and double the participant’s investment, or keep all of the
money for themselves. Participants were told that the outcomes
of three randomly selected interactions would be chosen to
count, and that they could earn significant amounts of money
or lose the investments in these interactions. In actuality, all
trustees were fake and participants were all paid a fixed $5
bonus for their participation.
During the fMRI session, participants made single-shot trust
decisions to invest with 150 trustees (50 ingroup, 50 outgroup
and 50 control). For each trial, participants saw a picture of the
trustee and group membership information (or no information)
and had 3 s to decide how much money ($0 to $4 in increments
of $1) to entrust. Underneath the photograph of the trustee
were dollar amounts ($0 to $4 in increments of $1) ascending
from left to right. Trial order was randomized and each trial was
followed by a random jittered inter-trial interval (1, 3 or 5 s).
Visual stimuli were presented using E-prime and projected onto
a large-screen flat-panel display monitor that participants
viewed in a mirror mounted on the scanner. Following the com-
pletion of the task, participants were shown the outcomes of
three randomly selected interactions and paid their bonus
money based on these investments.
Stimuli. The interaction partners were represented by facial
photographs along with their group membership: ingroup was
depicted by a Stanford University logo, outgroup was depicted
by a Cal logo, or control (no group membership displayed).
Photographs were drawn from the first author’s photo database
and consisted of color pictures of forward-looking male faces
with neutral expressions. Photographs were randomly-
distributed to belong to the ingroup, outgroup or control condi-
tions and were balanced across race.
MRI data acquisition. All images were collected on a 3.0T GE
Discovery MR750 scanner at the Center for Cognitive and
Neurobiological Imaging at Stanford University. Functional
images were acquired with a T2*-weighted gradient echo pulse
sequence (TR¼ 2 s, TE¼ 24 ms, flip angle¼ 77) with each vol-
ume consisting of 46 axial slices (2.9-mm-thick slices, in-plane
resolution 2.9 mm isotropic, no gap, interleaved acquisition).
Functional images were collected in one run (consisting of 150
trials). High-resolution structural scans were acquired with a
T1-weighted pulse sequence (TR¼ 7.2 ms, TW¼ 2.8 ms, flip
angle¼ 12) after functional scans, to facilitate their localization
and co-registration.
MRI data analysis. All statistical analyses were conducted
using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology).
Functional images were reconstructed from k-space using a lin-
ear time interpolation algorithm to double the effective sam-
pling rate. Image volumes were corrected for slice-timing skew
using temporal sinc interpolation and for movement using
rigid-body transformation parameters. Functional data and
structural data were co-registered and normalized into a stand-
ard anatomical space (2-mm isotropic voxels) based on the echo
planar imaging and T1 templates (Montreal Neurological
Institute), respectively. Images were smoothed with a 5-mm
full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. To remove drifts
within sessions, a high-pass filter with a cut-off period of 128 s
was applied. Visual inspection of motion correction estimates
confirmed that no subject’s head motion exceeded 2.0 mm in
any dimension from one volume acquisition to the next.
Functional images were analyzed to identify neural activity
that was parametrically modulated by trust amounts for
ingroup and outgroup targets, and neural activity associated
with individual differences in intergroup trust bias. Two ana-
lytic approaches were used.
The first analytic approach sought to identify neural activity
associated with parametric increases in trust decisions based
on group membership. The parametric analytic approach pro-
vided estimates of trust at a trial-by-trial, within-subject level,
by capitalizing on the repeated-measures nature of our experi-
mental design. The GLM consisted of three regressors of inter-
est: the trust decision periods for ingroup, outgroup, and control
conditions. These regressors were modeled as stick functions at
the onset of each trial and convolved with a canonical (double-
gamma) hemodynamic response function. In addition, each
onset was weighted by the dollar amount sent to the trustee
during each trial. To do so, parametric modulators of the dollar
amount sent to the trustee on each trial were included for each
of the three regressors of interest (ingroup, outgroup and con-
trol). Finally, six regressors of non-interest modeled participant
head movement during the scan.
First, contrasts identified neural activity related to parametric
increases in trust regardless of group membership (ingroup and
outgroup trust vs baseline). Next, we sought to examine whether
intergroup trust is supported by dissociable neural systems.
To do so, we sought to identify brain regions that (i) parametric-
ally tracked increases in trust decisions for ingroup targets and
(ii) did so to a greater extent for ingroup vs outgroup targets.
Similarly, we sought to identify brain regions that (i) parametric-
ally tracked increases in outgroup trust and (ii) did so to a greater
extent for outgroup versus ingroup targets. Therefore, the ana-
lysis strategy proceeded in two steps. First, we examined neural
activity that parametrically tracked trust amounts during the
ingroup condition significantly above baseline (ingroup paramet-
ric condition>baseline). Second, we masked the results by brain
regions that tracked trust amount for the ingroup condition sig-
nificantly more strongly than the outgroup condition
(ingroup>outgroup parametric contrast), using the minimum
statistic approach (Nichols et al., 2005). We similarly isolated neu-
ral systems that parametrically tracked increases in outgroup
trust significantly above baseline (outgroup parametric condi-
tion>baseline), and masked the results by brain regions that sig-
nificantly tracked trust amount for the outgroup over and above
the ingroup condition (outgroup> ingroup parametric contrast).
The aim of the second analytic approach was to identify
whether brain regions that parametrically tracked trust for in-
and outgroup members at a within-subject level were also asso-
ciated with intergroup breakdowns in trust at a between-subject
level, that is, unevenly favoring ingroup over outgroup trust. To
test this question, we first computed a trust bias score (ingroup
trust amount—outgroup trust amount) for each participant.
Next, we used multiple regression to test whether individual dif-
ferences in trust bias significantly correlated with neural activa-
tion in the ingroup>outgroup main effect contrast. Given that
the small samples that are common in fMRI designs provide lim-
ited power to test individual differences, we limited our search to
brain regions that were parametrically associated with trust
within-subjects. To do so, we masked the individual difference
analysis by brain regions that were parametrically modulated by
ingroup and outgroup trust.
374 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2017, Vol. 12, No. 3
Main effect maps were thresholded at P< 0.005, with a spa-
tial extent threshold of k¼ 23, corresponding to a threshold of
P< 0.05 corrected for multiple comparison (derived with 15 000
Monte Carlo simulations using the current release of the AFNI
program 3dClustSim). To compute the thresholds for maps of
the two-way conjunctions, we used Fisher’s method (Fisher,
1925), which combines probabilities of multiple hypothesis tests
using the following formula:
x2 ¼ 2
Xk
i¼1
log eðPiÞ;
where Pi is the P-value for the ith test being combined, k is the
number of tests being combined and the resulting statistic has a
v2 distribution with 2k degrees of freedom. Thus, thresholding
each test of a two-way conjunction at P-values of 0.024 corres-
ponded to a combined voxel-wise threshold P-value of 0.005,
with an extent threshold of k¼ 23, corresponding to a corrected
threshold of P< 0.05 (derived with Monte Carlo simulations
using AFNI program 3dClustSim).
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. Finally, we con-
ducted PPI analyses to identify brain regions (e.g. dACC, LPFC
and other control-related areas) exhibiting an increase in correl-
ation with the striatum during trust decisions. In particular, we
were interested whether the strength of such correlations
would be greater for outgroup vs ingroup trust decisions.
First, we defined the seed volume of interest (VOI) as the stri-
atum region that tracks parametric trial-by-trial increases in
trust regardless of group membership. For each participant, we
extracted time-series of activation from the striatum mask VOI
described above. Variance associated with the six motion
regressors was removed from the extracted time-series. Next,
we computed a first-level whole-brain GLM for each participant
that included the following regressors: (i) an interaction be-
tween neural activity in striatum and the onset of trust deci-
sions for ingroup, outgroup and control targets convolved with
the canonical HRF, (ii) a regressor specifying the onset of all tri-
als convolved with the canonical HRF and (iii) the original BOLD
eigenvariate from the striatum seed VOI (i.e. average time-
series from the striatum mask). Finally, the GLM included six
nuisance regressors that modeled head motion during the scan
across the whole brain volume, as well as additional nuisance
regressors for single time-points where motion spikes occurred.
We used two different metrics to assess motion spikes: (i)
frame-to-frame head motion that exceeded 1.0 mm in rotation/
translation parameters and (2) signal intensity differences for
each volume greater than 2.5 s.d. from the global mean signal
intensity. All motion spikes were removed via regression
(Satterthwaite et al., 2013; Power et al., 2015). This procedure
removed an average of 0.17% of volumes (range 0–1.2%). These
additional procedures were implemented in order to reduce
false positives in connectivity analyses, which are especially
sensitive to head motion.
Single subject contrasts were then calculated (Trust irre-
spective of group>baseline; Outgroup trust> Ingroup trust;
Ingroup trust>Outgroup trust). Second-level group contrasts
were calculated based on the single subject contrasts. Results
report areas exhibiting positive correlations with striatum, as
captured by the first regressor in the GLM. Contrasts were
thresholded using the 3dClustSim thresholding procedure
described above.
Study 2
Participants. A total of 616 US participants (248 female, mean
age¼ 30.69 years, s.d.¼ 10.08) were recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Unlike Study 1, which employed a repeated-
measures design, Study 2 employed a between-subject and
single-shot design. The sample size was pre-determined to pro-
vide power of 0.80 to detect differences in intergroup trust based
on an estimated effect size of d¼ 0.35, derived from a recent
quantitative meta-analysis on intergroup cooperation (Balliet
et al., 2014). Data collected through Mechanical Turk are as reli-
able as those collected through traditional methods
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). Participants were excluded (n¼ 79)
from analyses if they failed attention checks (catch scenarios:
Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
Procedure. Participants were introduced to the trust game, in
which they were endowed with $0.20 and would have the op-
tion to invest their money with another MTurk worker from
around the world. We instructed participants that they stood to
gain substantial bonus payments based on their investments,
but also risked losing their endowment altogether. Participants
first entered their name and nationality (we limited participa-
tion to American MTurk workers from the USA).
Fig. 1. Study 1 task and behavioral responses. (A) Example ingroup trust trial. On
each trial, participants had 3 s to decide how much money to invest with trust-
ees. Trustees were either ingroup members (Stanford students) or outgroup
members (Cal students), which were represented by the school logo appearing
next to the trustee photographs. (B) Behavioral responses varied significantly by
group: participants trusted ingroup members with a significantly greater propor-
tion of money than outgroup members or control. Error bars represent SEM.
Table 1. Brain regions that parametrically track increases in trust
overall, irrespective of group
Region of activation BA Coordinates
(x, y, z, in mm)
T-stat Cluster
size
Cerebellum 18, 55, 18 6.27 1301
Postcentral gyrus 4 63, 14, 28 5.99 796
dMPFC 10 6, 48, 16 5.43 956
dACC 9/24 18, 38, 24 5.27
vMPFC 11 0, 50, 8 4.57
Right hippocampus 32, 12, 20 5.07 135
Left hippocampus 32, 24, 18 4.56 109
PCC 31 8, 44, 32 4.52 418
Inferior temporal 37 44, 52, 16 4.50 132
LPFC 9/46 50, 20, 28 4.50 148
Right striatum 10, 20, 0 3.70 66
Left striatum 12, 16, 6 3.61 65
dMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex;
vMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; LPFC,
lateral prefrontal cortex.
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Next, participants were introduced to the Trustee for the
trust game. Participants were randomly paired with either
‘David from the United States’ and were shown an American
flag (Ingroup condition), or with ‘Diego from Spain’ and were
shown a Spanish flag (Outgroup condition). Participants then
completed a single round from the trust task. Participants used
a slider in increments of $0.01 and decided how much of their
$0.20 endowment to invest with the Trustee. Critically, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of the two versions of the
Trust Game used in prior research (Rand et al., 2014): partici-
pants were either forced to make their decisions in less than
10 s (intuition condition), or were told to deliberate for at least
10 s before making their decision. Specifically, in the Intuition
condition, participants were told to make their decisions ‘as
quickly as possible’ and that they had 10 s to make their deci-
sion (a timer counted down from 10 to highlight the speeded na-
ture of the task). In the Deliberation condition, participants were
told to ‘stop and think before making their decision’ and waited
for 10 s before they could enter a response (a timer counted up
to 10 to highlight that they must wait until the timer has
elapsed to enter their response).
Results
Study 1
Behavioral results. Overall, participants trusted ingroup members
more than outgroup members [ingroup: M ¼ $1.72, s.d.¼ 0.46;
outgroup: M ¼ $1.45, s.d.¼ 0.58; t(20) ¼ 2.80, P ¼0.010, d ¼ 0.51].
Participants also trusted ingroup members more than controls
[ingroup: M ¼ $1.72, s.d.¼ 0.44; control: M ¼ $1.28, s.d.¼ 0.58;
t(20)¼3.98, P < 0.001, d ¼ 0.84], but did not distrust outgroup
members less than controls [outgroup: M ¼ $1.45, s.d.¼ 0.58;
control: M ¼ $1.28, s.d.¼ 0.58; t(20)¼1.85, P¼ 0.08, d ¼ 0.29]
(Figure 1B). Finally, there were no significant differences in reac-
tion time between conditions [ingroup RT: M¼ 1.71s, s.d.¼ 0.25s;
outgroup RT: M¼ 1.69s, s.d.¼ 0.29s; control RT: M¼ 1.66,
s.d.¼ 0.26s; t(20)¼0.78, P> 0.25, d¼ 0.07].
Neuroimaging results. Next, we sought to address whether
intergroup trust is supported by dissociable underlying mech-
anisms. Because we were interested in the correspondence
between brain activity and trust behavior, we employed trial-by-
trial parametric analyses, within subjects, to separately isolate
brain regions in which engagement significantly tracked (i) the
amount of money that investors trusted ingroup trustees above
baseline and (ii) outgroup trustees above baseline (for trust-
related brain activity irrespective of group; Table 1). We found
that activity in bilateral striatum and vMPFC (among other re-
gions) parametrically tracked increases in ingroup trust (Table 2).
Conversely, activity in dACC and LPFC (among other regions)
parametrically tracked increases in outgroup trust (Table 3).
Next, we isolated brain regions involved in preferentially
trusting ingroup, when compared with outgroup, members (and
vice versa). We find that activation in striatum tracks ingroup
trust to a significantly greater degree than outgroup trust
(ingroup parametric condition>outgroup parametric condition;
Figure 2A). In contrast, we find that activation in dACC tracks
outgroup trust to a significantly greater degree than ingroup
trust (outgroup parametric condition> ingroup parametric con-
dition; Figure 2B).
The data from the within-subject parametric contrasts sug-
gest that ingroup and outgroup trust decisions are supported by
dissociable underlying mechanisms. Whereas striatum activa-
tion significantly tracks the degree of ingroup (but not outgroup)
trust, dACC activation significantly tracks outgroup (but not
ingroup) trust. If this dissociation relates functionally to inter-
group failures in trust, then it should also track individuals’
intergroup trust bias, or their tendency to favor trusting ingroup
over outgroup members. To address this question, we opera-
tionalized trust bias by computing difference scores between
each participant’s ingroup trust rating and outgroup trust rat-
ing. Next, we conducted a regression analysis that examined
whether individual differences in trust bias correlate with
greater neural activation during ingroup over outgroup trust
decisions at a between-subject level (ingroup trust>outgroup
trust contrast).
Table 2. Brain regions that parametrically track ingroup trust
Region of activation BA Coordinates (x, y, z, in mm) T-stat Cluster size
Cerebellum 18, 46, 22 6.81 604
Postcentral gyrus 4 54, 16, 34 5.96 260
Left hippocampus 26, 12, 20 5.16 117
Left striatum 24, 22, 10 5.08 120
Inferior parietal 49 49, 46, 64 5.04 375
vMPFC 10/11 0, 38, 8 4.06 280
Right striatum 10, 20, 2 3.86 145
Right hippocampus 24, 8, 20 4.01 96
Inferior temporal 20 52, 44, 14 3.58 66
Precuneus 7 8, 58, 42 3.26 66
vMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Table 3. Brain regions that parametrically track outgroup trust
Region of activation BA Coordinates (x, y, z, in mm)T-statCluster size
dACC 9/24 18, 38, 24 6.43 511
dMPFC 10 6, 50, 16
vMPFC 11 8, 40, 10
Cerebellum 24, 64, 26 4.24 449
LPFC 46 40, 30, 22 4.00 52
PCC 23 8, 54, 24 3.48 42
Inferior parietal 2 44, 28, 48 3.42 44
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; dMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex;
vMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; LPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex; PCC, pos-
terior cingulate cortex.
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This analysis revealed that striatal activity—in clusters that
also parametrically tracked ingroup trust within participants—
significantly correlated with trust bias across participants
(Figure 2C and Table 3). That is, participants who engaged stri-
atum relatively strongly during ingroup trust decisions were
also more behaviorally biased, trusting ingroup over outgroup
members. Second, dACC and LPFC activity—in clusters that also
tracked outgroup trust within participants—significantly corre-
lated with trust bias correction across participants (Figure 2B, C
and Table 4). That is, participants that engaged greater dACC
and LPFC activation during outgroup trust decisions exhibited
less intergroup trust bias.
Finally, we conducted PPI analyses to identify brain regions
(e.g. dACC, LPFC and other control-related areas) exhibiting an
increase in correlation with the striatum during trust decisions.
In particular, we were interested whether the strength of such
correlations would be greater for outgroup versus ingroup trust
decisions. If the exertion of control is needed to increase out-
group trust, then functional connectivity between striatum and
control-related regions (e.g. dACC, LPFC) might be stronger for
outgroup vs ingroup targets. To address this question, we con-
ducted a PPI analysis that identifies brain regions that are func-
tionally coupled with the striatum VOI that tracks trial-by-trial
trust amounts (see the Methods section for more detail). Across
group membership conditions, we find that striatum activation
is significantly correlated with activation in control-related
brain regions, including the dACC, LPFC and TPJ (Table 5).
Crucially, the strength of connectivity between activation in
striatum and clusters in dACC and LPFC that also tracked in-
creases in outgroup trust was greater for outgroup than ingroup
targets (outgroup PPI> ingroup PPI; Figure 2C and Table 6).
These findings raise the possibility that control-related activa-
tion in dACC and LPFC may modulate subjective value-related
activity in striatum to increase outgroup trust. This possibility is
consistent with extant work showing increased connectivity be-
tween striatum and vMPFC with control-related activation in
dACC and LPFC in order to pursue long-term goals (e.g. Hare
et al., 2009).
Study 2
The results of Study 1 suggest that ingroup and outgroup trust
are supported by psychological mechanisms that differ in kind,
not degree. Specifically, whereas neural circuitry associated with
subjective value calculation (e.g. striatum) tracked ingroup (but
not outgroup) trust, cognitive control systems (e.g. dACC)
tracked outgroup (but not ingroup) trust. Taken together, these
neural findings led us to a novel behavioral prediction that fur-
ther tests a dual system model of intergroup trust. If outgroup,
but not ingroup trust requires the exertion of cognitive control,
Fig. 2. Neural activation from within-subject parametric analyses, between-subject regression, and psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses. (A) Parametric ana-
lyses revealed that increases in ingroup (but not outgroup) trust were significantly modulated by increases in striatum activation (left: x, y, z¼18, 10, 8; t¼3.19,
k¼288; right: x, y, z¼10, 20, 2; t¼3.17, k¼141). Bilateral striatum depicted in yellow was used as the seed VOI in subsequent PPI analyses. (B) Conversely, increases in
outgroup (but not ingroup) trust were significantly modulated by increases in dACC activation (x, y, z¼14, 42, 26; t¼2.95, k¼67). Red cluster was modulated by para-
metric trial-by-trial outgroup trust; green cluster was significantly correlated with the reduction of trust bias across participants; blue cluster was functionally coupled
with striatum during outgroup trust. (C) Whole-brain regression analyses revealed that activation in striatum—in clusters that parametrically tracked ingroup trust
within participants—also significantly correlated with trust bias across participants (right striatum: x, y, z¼16, 14, 2; left striatum: x, y, z¼16, 14, 2; t¼3.37, k¼250).
Second, dACC activation—in clusters that parametrically tracked outgroup trust within participants—significantly correlated with trust bias correction across partici-
pants (x, y, z¼12, 36, 36; t¼3.92, k¼40).
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then limiting the processing time needed to exert control
should reduce outgroup trust, but leave ingroup trust un-
affected. To test this prediction, a separate sample of partici-
pants completed a single-shot trust game with an outgroup
member or ingroup member in one of the two conditions: an
intuitive (speeded) condition, or a deliberative (non-speeded)
condition (Study 2).
We submitted participants’ trust decisions to a 2 (group:
ingroup vs outgroup)  2 (speed: intuition vs deliberation)
ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant group  speed
interaction [F(3,533)¼4.57, P ¼ 0.033, g P ¼ 0.01] (Figure 3).
Participants trusted ingroup members equally across the intui-
tive (M¼ ¢14.06, s.d.¼ 6.78) and deliberative (M¼ ¢14.53,
s.d.¼ 6.09) conditions [t(258)¼ 0.58, P> 0.250, d ¼ 0.07]. However,
participants trusted outgroup members significantly less in the
intuitive (M¼ ¢11.93, s.d.¼ 6.87) vs deliberative (M ¼ ¢14.78,
s.d.¼ 6.08) conditions [t(275)¼3.65, P< 0.001, d¼ 0.42]. These
findings suggest that people intuitively and automatically trust
ingroup members, but require cognitive resources to trust out-
group members even in non-competitive intergroup settings.
Study 2 demonstrated relatively small effects of deliberation
on intergroup cooperation (d¼ 0.42). Nonetheless, there are at
least two reasons to consider these effects noteworthy. First, ef-
fects in these ranges are thought to inform us about the cogni-
tive basis of cooperation in general (Rand et al., 2012, 2014), and
intergroup cooperation in particular (Balliet et al., 2014). Second,
small effect sizes associated with automatic or intuitive proc-
esses, such as implicit bias measures (Greenwald et al., 2015),
predict consequential forms of real world discrimination.
Discussion
Together, these experiments support a dual-process model of
intergroup trust, through multiple converging methods. We
capitalized on behavioral and neural markers of reward and
control to examine whether these processes make dissociable
contributions to intergroup trust. Across two studies, we found
that outgroup trust tracked dACC activation (Study 1) and
increased when participants had time to deliberate about their
decisions (Study 2). Conversely, ingroup trust tracked striatum
activation (Study 1) and was unaffected by deliberation time
(Study 2).
The pattern of behavioral results further suggests that
bounded rationality in intergroup trust does not produce irra-
tionally high ingroup trust (as ingroup trust did not decrease
with deliberation), but rather irrationally low outgroup trust.
People trusted outgroup members just as much as ingroup
members when they had time to deliberate, but intuitively dis-
trust outgroup members when processing time was limited
(Study 2). Moreover, these behaviors with small-stakes eco-
nomic games should translate to more consequential settings,
because game theoretic behavior is relatively scale invariant
(Johansson-Stenman et al., 2005; Kocher et al., 2008; Amir et al.,
2012), even when stakes are raised to three times participants’
monthly expenditure (Cameron, 1999; Henrich et al., 2001).
Taken together, this work demonstrates the translational value
of ‘behavioral phenotypes’ from game theory in informing us
about larger decisions, such as whether or not to cooperate
across group lines.
Finally, the dissociable neural mechanisms underlying inter-
group trust also relate to individual differences in intergroup
breakdowns in trust. Specifically, participants that engaged
greater striatum activation during ingroup trust decisions were
more biased toward trusting ingroup over outgroup members.
Participants that engaged greater dACC and LPFC activation
during outgroup trust decisions were less biased toward trusting
ingroup over outgroup members. Moreover, participants that
engaged greater dACC and LPFC activation during outgroup
trust decisions also engaged greater striatum activation during
Table 4. Brain regions that significantly correlate with individual dif-
ferences in intergroup trust bias
Region of
activation
BA Coordinates
(x, y, z, in mm)
T-stat Cluster size
Striatum 18, 16, 2 3.37 250
16, 14, 2
dACC 9/32 12, 36, 36 3.92 40
LPFC 46 46, 26, 32 3.99 99
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; LPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex.
Fig 3. Behavioral results (Study 2) revealed a significant interaction. In the intui-
tive condition, participants trusted ingroup members with a significantly greater
proportion of money than outgroup members. In the deliberative condition,
there was no significant difference between ingroup and outgroup trust. Error
bars represent SEM.
Table 5. Brain regions functionally connected with bilateral striatum
during intergroup trust decisions, irrespective of group
Region of
activation
BA Coordinates
(x, y, z, in mm)
T-stat Cluster size
dACC 9/32 3, 26, 31 7.22 30
LPFC 46 33, 44, 28 8.46 166
30, 44, 31 9.88 180
TPJ 60, 37, 37 7.10 35
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; LPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex; TPJ, tem-
poroparietal junction.
Table 6. Brain regions more strongly functionally coupled with bilat-
eral striatum during outgroup (versus ingroup) trust decisions
Region of
activation
BA Coordinates
(x, y, z, in mm)
T-stat Cluster size
dACC 9/32 9, 38, 31 3.09 129
LPFC 46 42, 18, 31 2.46 29
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; LPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex.
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outgroup (vs ingroup) interactions. These findings are consist-
ent with a dual-system model of decision-making, and suggest
that dACC and LPFC activation may increase outgroup trust by
modulating value-related activation in striatum. However, as
highlighted in Study 1 Methods above, whereas repeated-
measure fMRI designs provide stable estimates of within-
subject variability, the small samples employed in fMRI re-
search provide low power to robustly detect between-subjects
effects. Future work should employ larger samples to further
examine the relationship between activation in these systems
and individual differences in intergroup trust bias. Taken to-
gether, the findings across two studies suggest that people find
it intuitive and subjectively valuable to cooperate with ingroup
members, but uniquely exert control to override intuitive dis-
trust of outgroup members.
These findings extend key insights across a number of re-
search domains. First, these data add nuance to evidence about
the psychological structure of prosociality. A wellspring of evi-
dence collected over the last decade suggests that prosocial acts
such as altruistic giving and cooperation are reward-driven and
intuitive. First, brain regions involved in representing subjective
value—including the striatum and vMPFC—respond when indi-
viduals act in ways that are cooperative (Rilling et al., 2002), fair
(Zaki and Mitchell, 2011) or charitable (Hare et al., 2010). Second,
individuals pressured to make decisions quickly become more,
not less cooperative (Rand et al., 2014), suggesting that prosociality
is intuitive (Zaki and Mitchell, 2013). The current study condition-
alizes these insights, by demonstrating that intuitive, reward-
based features of trust are likely bounded by group membership.
These data are consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis
(Rand et al., 2014), which suggests that expectations about social
behaviors become ‘hard coded’ into intuitive responses, such that
individuals learn to intuitively cooperate or defect in social set-
tings based on past experience (Rand and Nowak, 2013). In this
context, intergroup encounters might generate a heuristic, intui-
tive distrust, which individuals must override through delibera-
tive efforts. These efforts may lead people to realize that trust—
even of outgroup members—may be payoff maximizing,
‘nudging’ people toward outgroup trust.
Our findings also contribute to a scientific understanding of
intergroup cognition. The majority of neuroscientific examin-
ations of intergroup cognition focus on racial group boundaries.
However, not all intergroup contexts are alike (Cikara and Van
Bavel, 2014). Race differs in crucial ways from other intergroup
contexts: race can induce motivations not common to other
intergroup settings. For instance, many people do not wish to
appear racially biased, and exert deliberative control to suppress
their implicit stereotypes (Devine, 1989). As such, individuals are
more likely to express racial biases through implicit channels,
which are largely outside deliberative control (Dovidio et al.,
1997; Payne, 2001). Other intergroup contexts differ fundamen-
tally from race along this dimension. For instance, in competi-
tive contexts ranging from sports rivalries to war, it is often
socially acceptable to express out-group antipathy (Cikara and
Van Bavel, 2014). People in these non-race contexts might not be
motivated to suppress outgroup bias, and often eagerly air out-
group antipathy.
Here, we show that non-racial intergroup contexts are simi-
lar to interracial contexts in some—but not all—of their compo-
nent processes. On one hand, neuroscientific work on race
shows that overriding implicit racial biases engages regions
involved in top-down control, such as dACC and LPFC
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Amodio et al., 2008). Here, we demon-
strate that these features of control extend to other intergroup
contexts, namely, overriding intuitive outgroup distrust. On the
other hand, neuroscientific work on race shows that decisions to
trust outgroup members engage regions associated with subject-
ive value, such as the striatum (Stanley et al., 2012). This could
signal the value or goal relevance of successfully suppressing
unwanted racial biases. The current study demonstrates that in
competitive intergroup contexts, striatum activation tracks
ingroup, not outgroup trust. In these non-racial contexts, stri-
atum activation may signal the value or goal relevance of affili-
ation with ingroup members, as compared to the value of
avoiding the appearance of bias. Together, these findings
deepen our understanding of the shared and distinct features
that characterize trust in racial versus non-racial intergroup
contexts.
Finally, our findings contribute to a growing body of research
on intergroup conflict resolution. Most interventions designed to
reduce intergroup conflict trade in the idea of increasing positive
and decreasing negative reactions toward outgroup members.
These types of interventions include increasing social contact
with outgroup members and promoting a sense of common
identity (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), taking the perspective of
outgroup members (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000) and regulat-
ing negative emotions about outgroup members (Halperin et al.,
2013). Although these interventions often foster positive inter-
group relations, they also backfire (Dixon et al., 2010). For ex-
ample, encouraging positive intergroup affect can delegitimize
negative affect experienced by low power groups in response to
inequality, which may promote rather than reduce injustice.
The current findings suggest that—at least in the domain of
trust—encouraging individuals to experience positive affect
toward outgroup members is not the only useful strategy to ad-
dress intergroup trust failures. This is because fundamentally
different mechanisms—including not only intuitive, affective ex-
perience, but also deliberative control—can support intergroup
trust. As such, interventions that encourage ‘cool’ or ‘System 2’
processing during intergroup interactions (Metcalfe and Mischel,
1999; Kahneman, 2003) might increase outgroup trust even with-
out changing individuals’ affective experiences. In the long-term,
cognitive strategies that increase intergroup cooperation may re-
duce conflict and promote social change.
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